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Introduction:  
    This paper focuses on the religious and political dynamics of the Markazi Jamiat Ahle 
Hadith (JAH) in Pakistan, within the current context of the spontaneous groundswell of 
religious zeal in Pakistan. It seeks to study the raison d'etre of this party, which has no 
popular support and overtly fosters militant jihadist networks in it's midst but is still 
capable of sustaining itself in mainstream politics through it's alliance with a popular 
political party, while simultaneously maintaining it's parasitical relationship with the 
military and the  Saudi financing community.  
 
    With the aim to meaningfully identify the nature of the party and put into perspective 
JAH's standing in Pakistani politics, the paper also focuses on the reasons and 
implications for JAH existence through which it is able to influence and disrupt public 
policy to some extent. It outlines the particular puritanically idealistic vision of Pakistan 
that is harbored by the JAH , tries to understand how this idealism nourishes the JAH 
and at the same time makes it irrelevant to the general public in Pakistan.  
 
     It also studies JAH's policies in the light of their Salafist doctrine and the extent to 
which this doctrine has an impact on it's relationship with politics and violence. The 
paper also studies how the organization's madrassas and educational networks create 
and glorify a culture of violence in the name of jihad and serve as the prime recruiting 
ground for jihadist groups. Ultimately the paper argues that the JAH's agenda is 
reflective more of it's political aspirations than it's religious ones, which is significant 
given that religion is the haloed rationale for JAH's existence around which it rallies it's 





A Brief Background:  
      The Markazi Jamiat Ahle Hadith (JAH), a religio-political party, is the central Salafist 
organization in Pakistan. The JAH, claims to be the only 'genuine'  representatives of the 
Saudi sponsored Ahle Hadith movement in Pakistan.1 This status provides them 
without a doubt with a potent array of advantages not the least of which is that it  gives 
them a clear upper hand within the religious community in Pakistan.2 Being closely 
linked to Saudia Arabia, the  JAH assiduously follows the lead of Saudi ulema' with their 
most orthodox and stringent school of interpretation of Islamic law. The party operates 
within small pockets and limited areas only, while their most visible following is the 
youth affiliated with their madrassas network.  
      Although the JAH had existed earlier as a religious group, it was transformed into a 
political party in 1986 under the leadership of Ehsan Elahi Zaheer. This was done, with 
the help of generous Saudi funding and support, to gain popular mandate and draw the 
Pakistani people into JAH's 'revivalist program' through electoral politics, instead of 
'remaining confined to mosques and madrassas'.3 Since the very occasion of it's 
launching the JAH embarked on a vehemently violent sectarian campaign to malign and 
harass Muslims from other sects and Sunni schools of thought. They also targeted the 
Ahmadi community with a vengeance, publicly inciting their followers to eliminate 
members of this sect. Zaheer's assassination in 1987, presumably by Shia militia, is said 
to have heralded the beginning of organized sectarian violence in the country. 4 
     In the political arena the JAH has managed to have a marginal presence inspite of the 
fact that it does not have any significant public support. The JAH has been closely 
aligned with the PML-N group ever since it's inception, an alliance that has somewhat 
served to fortify it's standing in the political sphere by allowing JAH to be represented in 
the Parliament through a few members.5 JAH was also part of the Muttahida Majlis-e-
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Amal (MMA), an alliance of Islamist parties, that  came into power with 11.3 percent of 
the popular vote at the 2002 elections.6 The party is currently led by Professor Sajid Mir, 
who is currently a member of the Pakistan Senate.  
      Initially the JAH had tepid relations with the military, given the fact that it did not 
support the Afghan jihad. However in the consequent years the JAH 'fell in' with the ISI 
strategy to cultivate ties with radical Islamist groups in order to counter other such 
groups.7  Therefore inspite of it's lack of public following, the JAH have thrived in an 
environment conducive to Islamist political activism and militancy where they have had 
the privilege to be sustained by free-flowing Saudi money, assisted by a mainstream 
political party and protected by Pakistani intelligence services.  
 
The JAH's Vision of Pakistan: 
    The JAH upholds a manifestly puritanical vision of Pakistan that seems excessive and 
out of sync with the sentiments of the general population. This possibly largely accounts 
for the fact that this party has no significant public following.  
      Following the hard-line religious and political discourse purported by the Salafist 
ideology, JAH seeks to "empower society by providing a universal alternative model of 
truth and social action". 8One of the major focus of JAH's political agenda is it's effort to 
address the "deliberate and organized efforts at the state level to replace honorable 
Muslim values in society with the offensive Western culture".9 The party is vehemently 
against the 'Westernization' of Pakistani society and is generally suspicious of all 
modernity. It  aggressively calls for taking measures at the state level to arrest 'vulgarity 
and obscenity' in the media and public sphere. 
       The JAH believes that the cure to all of Pakistan's problems lies in returning to the 
'original' form of the religion, cleansed of 'innovations that have misguided the faithful'. 
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It describes Pakistan‘s crises as a consequence of "a weakness of faith", which has been 
"poisoned by secular democracy". It  also threatens with "direct action against secular, 
anti-Muslim forces" who "as agents of colonists were cashing in on the Muslims' 
disunity and had obliterated the ideological and cultural identity of the country". 10 
         JAH also pursues an overtly hostile rejectionist policy towards all those whose 
beliefs differ from theirs and remain convinced that they alone embody authentic faith 
in Pakistan.11 Among others they describe their fellow Sunni Deobandis as mushrikin 
(unbelievers) for their veneration of the Prophet and vilify the Barelvi's and the Sufis for 
wrongful innovations in their practices, considering them to ignorant shrine-
worshippers.12 The JAH is also in the forefront of the radical Sunni groups as standard-
bearers of anti-Shi'ism in Pakistan. The founder of JAH, Ehsan Elahi Zaheer blamed the 
Shias of heresy and accused them of being Zionist agents in Islamic countries in his 
magnum opus, titled 'Shias and Shiism'.13 
 
        The JAH also considers Ahmedis to be heretics. It seeks the removal of Ahmedis 
from key government offices and restoration of contentious information about Ahmedis 
in academic syllabi, removed during the  Musharraf era under public pressure. Recently 
it has sought to ban the Ahmedis from the  public places and called for the destruction 
of their mosques or 'centers of apostasy'. According to the official JAH literature "it is the 
religious duty of every Muslim to dispatch an Ahmedis to hell".14 They also issue fatwas 
against other Muslim sects as part of their quest for religious purity and regularly 
publish and distribute anti-Ahmedi and anti-Shiism tracts. The JAH also strongly 
supports the contentious blasphemy law in Pakistan and has been campaigning 
assiduously against it's amendment in the recent times.15 
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      In terms of economic policy the JAH considers the prevalent economic system as 'un-
Islamic', calling for an introduction of Islamic provisions in the economic sphere. It also 
denounces the governments decisions to take loans from hegemonic international 
agencies and instead calls for 'taking help from friendly Muslim countries'.16  The JAH 
also harbors a rigidly restrictive outlook towards foreign policy with it's outright 
rejection of all efforts for peaceful reconciliation with India, without first 'making Delhi 
to solve Kashmir issue', and any overtures towards the recognition of Israel. 17 
     As with other religious parties JAH leadership tries to appease public opinion by 
indulging in excessive anti-American rhetoric. The louder the rhetoric the more it 
consolidates the party's religious credentials.18 Consequently the JAH vehemently 
condemns US attacks in tribal areas and believes that Washington should be "held 
responsible for terrorism and global unrest".  They are not only anti-American because 
of Washington's support to Israel but also because of it's overt backing of successive 
moderate 'un-Islamic'  governments in the past.19 
      JAH therefore fits perfectly into the textbook description of militant-sectarian 
organizations which follow ―organized and militant religious-political activism whose 
specific aim is to safeguard and promote the sociopolitical interests of their particular 
Muslim sectarian community.‖ It has it's own ―discourse of power,‖ which promises 
empowerment of their particular sect ―in tandem with greater adherence to Islamic 
norms in public life.‖ It also hopes to achieve greater power and greater piety ―through 
mobilization of the sectarian identity in question and the marginalization of the rival 
sectarian communities, largely through prolific use of violence.‖20  
 
The Role of Madrassas and Mosques :  
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     The JAH has direct control over the Wifaq ul Madaris Salafiya, which controls Salafi 
madrassas all over Pakistan. The headquarters for the Wifaq ul Madaris Salafiya is located 
at the Jamiaa Salafiya in Faisalabad, which is personally headed by Professor Sajid Mir 
and serves as the hub of all of JAH's religious activity.21 This network not only provides 
a ready platform for promulgating Salafist rhetoric of the top JAH leadership to the 
public and is a convenient means for disseminating JAH propaganda to thousands of 
students affiliated with the network.  
  
    This network has witnessed a stunning increase in membership since the late 1980's, 
which is directly traceable to private Saudi financial support. The Saudi Arabian 
organizations, like the Harmain Islamic Foundation etc reportedly provide direct 
financial assistance to all the JAH madrassas.22 In keeping with the advent of the 
'Madrassa industry' in the post-Afghan war era, 23 the JAH network set out earnestly to 
take part in the recruiting and converting thousands of young men to bring them into 
the Ahle Hadith fold. The number of JAH madrassas in Pakistan have grown fourfold, 
with the total number of 134 madrassas in 1988 reaching 3,000 by 2006. Many observers 
describe their success in setting up new madrassas and ‗converting‘ other madrassas as  
'phenomenal' . 24  
     This madrassa network also provides the primary support base to the jihadist 
elements in the organization. The foot soldiers of militant Islam are the socially deprived 
poor who have relied on the madrassas for their very survival, and have been politicized 
and radicalized towards violence in defense of what their indoctrination continuously 
impresses upon them - that Islam is under threat from a non-Muslim, Judeo-Christian 
axis.25 These madrassas, which are largely unmonitored and unregulated by government 
agencies, continue to create an environment conducive to religious bigotry and 
extremism. Many of the Salafist teachings they employ describe militant jihad against 
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infidels to be ―the summit of Islam‖, as  ―one of the noblest and most magnificent acts of 
obedience to God‖, where martyrdom is a ―noble life force‖ because "Islam requires all 
apostates to be killed―. Textbooks used in these schools glorify the martyr killed in the 
pursuit of jihad and encourage children to sacrifice their lives for ―the great nuclear 
power that Pakistan has become.‖26 
     Unlike madrassas from other schools of thought this network combines Islamic 
education with a modern curriculum teaching subjects like English, mathematics and 
science.27 This is also makes them attractive for the lower middle class families who 
cannot afford private English medium schools but seek a dignified education for their 
children. However this network largely aims to use contemporary academic systems 
along with modern technology to spread the message of jihad and prepare children from 
a young age to become mujahideen. Infact according to given statistics most of these 
centers function as 'feeder schools' for a multitude of jihadist organizations  but mainly 
for the JAH's jihadist wing the Tehreek ul Mujahideen.28 
 
Rivalry with other Ahle Hadith Groups: 
 
    Within Pakistan, the Ahle Hadith groups suffer from systemic fragmentation and 
incessant internal strife and consequently they spend significant time and energy 
vilifying each other. JAH which is considered to be the central Ahle Hadith party does 
not have cordial relations with any of the other Ahle Hadith groups because of intrinsic 
political differences over rites, rituals and strategy.29 JAH's principal challengers are the 
Jamaat ud Dawaa (JuD) and it's jihadist offshoot the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). The JAH 
had aggressively opposed the formation of the Markaz Dawat ul Irshad(MDI), the 
earlier avatar of JuD, because of a perceived sense of competition.  The JAH leadership 
was so proactive in their campaign against the MDI, that the MDI could initially not get 
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any Saudi funding because of JAH opposition. The JAH had also barred the MDI (JuD) 
and LeT from recruiting any student from their madrassas.30 
    
      The biggest contention between these groups lies in their different doctrinal outlooks 
towards jihad. The JAH considers jihad to be a 'fardh kifaya' (non-compulsory obligation) 
while the LeT considers it to be 'fardh-e-ain' (compulsory obligation)'.31 Because the JAH 
controls the Ahl-e-Hadith Madrassas, it is extremely difficult for LeT to recruit from 
these madrassas. Consequently the JAH and it's jihadist wing the Tehreek-e-Mujahedeen 
are extremely hostile towards the LeT and the JuD.  
 
      Another factor in this rivalry is that because the JAH had opposed the jihad in 
Afghanistan at the time of its launch, it was sidelined by the military. Coerced into 
existence largely at the behest of the ISI, when the LeT emerged on the jihadi front and 
slowly marginalized the JAH. Many in TM view LeT as an organization that was created  
by the ISI to undercut it's religious standing. By mid-1990, the LeT had become the 
biggest Ahle Hadith jihadist group, openly challenging the supremacy of the JAH.32 
Infact, LeT's Hafiz Saeed publicly derided the JAH for it's inertia against waging jihad, 
further corroding their religious standing in their perception. In return, the JAH openly 
blame LeT for making money out of jihad by embezzling large sums of money collected 
for the sake of this cause. 33 
 
A Drift towards Militancy: 
       
    Interestingly then the JAH only co-opted its jihadist wing the Kashmir based Tehreek-
e-Mujahedeen, in 1996 after it was blamed incessantly by other Ahle Hadith 
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organizations for being overly interested in politics and not being militant enough.34 
They seem to have been forced into this alliance by circumstances as they obviously did 
not want to be left behind in a social culture that had somewhat venerated jihadist 
recruitment and had infact turned into a 'jihad factory'.35 In doing so JAH also fell in 
conveniently with the ISI strategy of giving low-profile political parties a limited but 
well-defined role in the Kashmir jihad, which would advocate for a political solution to 
the Kashmir issue and thus give a political facade to the jihad.36  
  
    This collaboration with the ISI has eventually led the JAH to adopt an increasingly 
aggressive stance in terms of it's jihadist goals. It's ties with the state and the military 
have further strengthened over the years, in keeping with the military establishment's 
policy to restrict the growth of secular and ethnic-based political parties that often do 
not share the establishment‘s hostility toward India.37 The Military and the mullahs have 
been symbiotically linked to each other in Pakistan‘s politics for decades and in JAH's 
case, both have often needed and helped the other attain their respective goals. The JAH 
provides a convenient cover up for jihadist activities and the military extends its support 
by secretly encouraging radicalism, while routinely denying that it is doing so - as has 
been a consistent feature of the Establishment‘s practice. 38 
 
     Consequently over the years the JAH has become gradually more violent in its 
outlook, in comparison with other religious organizations like the JI which also overtly 
supported militancy through the Hizbul Mujahideen (HB) but started abandoning the 
culture of violence by the late 1990's in the favor of political dialogue. 39 In a stark 
contrast to this trend, the JAH sponsored TM has time and again threatened peace 
initiatives in Kashmir and ostracized the political leaders for their 'anti-jihad policies'.40 
On the political front the JAH's anti-India propaganda has been becoming increasingly 
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virulent. They publicly justify this violence in the name of Islam, calling the Indians 
'infidels' and apostates and therefore reducing the concept of jihad to a violent struggle 
against infidels, whether armed or unarmed- men, women and children.41    
 
    Currently the  JAH is among those Salafi groups that openly espouse violence.42 
Officially the fact that group rejects bloodshed on paper makes them, in some ways, 
untouchable.43 But their promotion of the same ideology that militant radicals follow, 
with its rigid rejection of any other form of Islamic practice, marks them out as 
extremists in their own right—and ones whose message could easily be twisted into 
violence. In a way militant rhetoric and violence has become a political weapon for them 
with which to threaten, believers and unbelievers alike.44 
 
Jihadist Connections:  
       
     Inspite of the fact that the JAH extended political patronage to Tehreek al 
Mujahedeen publicly in 2000 after having adopting it covertly in 1996,  the JAH leaders 
like Professor Sajid Mir and Maulana Shabudin Madani had attended conferences in 
Kashmir under the banner of TM as far back as 1990.45 One of the main reasons behind 
their earlier affiliation was to increase public support and increase their standing in the 
religious community. Initially when JAH adopted the TM in 1996 as its militant wing, 
the TM fighters led by Maulana Jamilur Rehman consisted largely of freedom fighters 
from the Occupied Kashmir. Although the TM attracted a minimal amount of 
Kashmiris, it trained thousands of young Pakistani recruits from the JAH at its training 
camps which were set up all over the country under ISI patronage. 46 
 
     The JAH and consequently TM currently both work in close collaboration with the 
ISI. The main ISI support for TM comes in the form of unconditional authorization to 
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operate and expand militant training camps in Pakistan. The ISI provides funds to the 
TM for operations in Indian Kashmir. However most funds for TM come from the Saudi 
government agencies through JAH, which enjoys official Saudi support for all its socio-
political activities. In return for this support JAH follows and implements Saudi agenda. 
The growth of numerous jihadi groups in Pakistan incidentally threatens the 'interests' 
of Saudi Arabia. Therefore supporting TM is sort of an 'insurance' against unwanted 
threat and intimidation from other jihadist groups.47 
    
   This merger between JAH and TM brought about to the 'Pakistanization' of the group 
and the consequent 'broadening of their horizons'.48 TM's affiliation with the JAH has 
also eventually led to a hardening of it's initial flexible position towards peaceful 
negotiations and political dialogue with the Indian government. The TM is increasingly 
developing a global or at least regional outlook. Apart from the militant activities in 
Kashmir, there is other evidence to suggest that  JAH and TM members have been 
involved in terrorism elsewhere. 49 
 
     In 2007 security agencies raided a JAH supported madrassa, the  Darsatul Islamia in 
Karachi to arrest 19 students in connection with the Bali bombings. The madrassa was 
however not shut down nor was it penalized for any connections with terrorism. 50 In 
the recent past the JAH leadership has been found on record to have openly threatened 
Western civilians in Pakistan for 'polluting' the society with immorality and openly 
invited 'true followers' to attack America and American targets. On their part the JAH 
consider such actions to be 'justifiable' and further glorify them.51 
         
       Such activism has an ideological explanation in the fact that Salafism as practiced by 
JAH represents a social and religious movement which has manifest inclinations 
towards political violence. Many critics point out that one of the weakest aspect of 
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Salafism is the 'underdeveloped nature of its political vocabulary'.52 Since Salafism 
places emphasis on doctrinal purity and not politics, it's contentious link with politics 
forms the 'central dilemma' in Salafism.53 As is the case with Salafist groups openly 
indulging in politics, the JAH's overt political activism transcended politics and has 
eventually taken the form of violence and jihad. In other words it  has 'shaded off' into 
the political violence that seems intrinsic to Salafism.54 
     While Salafism is by no means a monolithic entity and most Salafis are divided on the 
issue of political activism, they all agree on the definitive principles such as the doctrine 
of 'al-wala' wal-l-bara' which upholds that one must show loyalty to God and provide 
assistance to fellow Muslims, while evincing hatred and enmity towards non-Muslims. 
This doctrine forms the basis for violent engagement with non-Muslims and the practice 
of takfir towards fellow Muslims, which basically legitimizes the use of violence against 
other Muslims.55  In keeping with this the JAH upholds both the doctrine of 'al-wala' wal-
l-bara' and considers takfir not only to be a legitimate practice but also a religious duty 
incumbent upon the individual believers. 56   
Religious vs. Political Agenda: 
 
         The JAH, like all other Ahle Hadith has limited appeal beyond some segments of  
urban commercial and professional middle classes. Although they have gained some 
political strength since the 1990's and are more organized than the other Ahle Hadith 
groups, they remain a negligible minority with narrow, puritanical views.57 JAH does 
not have any mass following and has never been able to win a seat in the Parliament on 
its own, but it's affiliation with PML-N enables it to so and allows it to have some 
standing in the national politics. For PML-N in turn, an affiliation with the JAH adds to 
their religious respectability and provides it with a powerful conduit to Saudi Arabia. It 
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can be noted that the JAH has been a significant factor in cementing the PML-N's 
resilient relations with the Saudi government.58 
 
       Within the religious community in Pakistan Salafist factions like the JAH are 
considered to be an elitist group who worship in separate mosques and refuse to pray 
behind imams belonging to other sects. In many cases they refuse certain occupations 
and avoid socializing for the fear of contamination of their purity by mingling with 
mushrikeen or non-believers.59 Reflecting this the JAH leadership, with its encouragement 
of religious disharmony, seems clearly focused on furthering politically motivated 
interpretations of Islam which serve only to reinforce the divisions between Muslims in 
general. This leadership continues to use Islam for fostering exclusionary politics and to 
consolidate their own power base, especially since it lacks political legitimacy. Their 
success lies largely on their dexterous political manouevering rather than their religious 
credentiels.60   
 
       In this respect it can be argued that they are following a political agenda rather than 
a religious one, as they claim to do. The JAH has never shied away from compromising 
it's religious values in order to further their political career as is evident from its  
subservient and parasitical affiliations with the military establishment on the one hand 
and the Saudi government on the other.  In other words their policies speak more about 
their political ambitions than their religious preferences. In this regard the Islamic 
revivalism that is envisoned and propagated by JAH seems inextricably linked to power 




    The analysis of the JAH's relgious and political dynamics reveals a symbiotic 
relationship between political religosity and militancy. It can be argued that encouraging 
genuine Islamic scholarship and a public debate on this relationship may present a 
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solution to the endemic violence that has begun to characterize the religious politics in 
Pakistan. Many scholars therefore conclude that only politically viable solutions in 
Pakistan can effectively suppress militant Salafism practiced by the JAH, making the 
government more accountable to the people by responding to demands coming from 
below and the need for stronger democratizing tendencies which incorporate 
mainstream religious inclinations.61  
 
     Others however believe that policy cannot help, simply because actions of 
government and it's allies are often at odds with their stated policy of rejecting all 
association with  orthodox, militant groups.  This is the current official position taken by 
the state, but behind the scenes the government continues to collaborate with radical 
elements like the JAH for their own desired objectives. In this way it becomes harder to 
believe that such a policy can hope to stem the tide of religious radicalism that seems to 
be overwhelming Pakistani society.62  
 
    On their part the JAH seem to have no specific solutions to the problems that beset the 
country or the common man and they only talk in generalities like most religious parties 
with similar agendas. In the context of public support the JAH is unlikely to engender 
any significant public support as it continues to move towards an extreme right wing 
position. The JAH's hostile 'othering of non-Salafi' Muslims has a very negative impact 
on the party's image.63 The JAH also symbolizes the the sectarian-jihadi complex that 
feeds off Shiites and other minorities' lives which further takes away from their integrity 
as a mainstream religious party.  
 
    Like their contemporaries the JAH will most likely continue to use it's 'nuisance 
value'64 in the form of street power to coax alliances with other parties and thus obtain 
an odd seat for their leaders. Eventually a majority of Pakistanis do not seem to want 
radical groups like the JAH to define their politics.65 Their vision of Pakistan, like their 
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other contemporaries, is so radical that they are held in contempt not only by the general 
public but also by the political and military Establishment that continues to sustain it. 66 
 
     But while they do not have broad social or political support , they represent a threat 
to public order with their violence and street mongering. What is also worrisome is the 
fact that, unlike it's overtly belligerent counterparts like the LeT and JuD, the JAH's 
political agenda allows it's militant factions to operate freely under the cover of it's 
ostensibly respectable political facade. So much so that the notion of a meaningful moral 
or political separation between the religiosity of this increasingly vocal religious group 
and the militant violence of jihadist groups becomes harder to maintain or even define.67 
 
      Inspite of their aggressive posturing however, it seems unlikely that radical groups 
like the JAH can threaten Pakistan in any significantly drastic way. Their attempts to 
infiltrate the state apparatus have been easily thwarted in the past, as they rely totally on 
state patronage for any political influence that they can exercise. In any case the Pakistan 
military is an insurmountable barrier in their attempts to gain power, since it would 
forcefully sideline any element that seeks to turn Pakistan into a comprehensively 
Islamic state. The utopian Islamic state envisioned by the JAH, which seeks to purify 
Pakistan of foriegn and un-Islamic practices is categorically rejected by the people and 
military, as is their desire to wage active war against India. 68 
 
      Having said that, while the military does not want to allow Islamist radicals to 
acquire any significant power in Pakistan, they are likely to keep manipulating  militant 
groups like the JAH for domestic and foreign policy purposes as 'strategic instruments 
of power'.69 The extent to which the military can exercise their control over such groups 
is however questionable. In many ways the assumption that Islamist forces and sectarian 
militias could be used and controlled has backfired against Pakistan‘s government and 
it's military, which is now faced with the serious challenge of rolling back these 
extremist elements. In other words 'the state is now beginning to fear its own success as 
it comes under attack from religious militants and rival Islamic groups battle each other 
with heavy weapons'. 70 
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      This can be assessed from the fact that the military has not had the courage to take 
any meaningful steps to challenge the growing muscle of groups like the JAH. In the 
context of the crackdown on terrorist groups in the post 9/11 scenario, it is significant to 
note that such groups which operate with the military support against India in Kashmir 
have been treated in a remarkably different and light-handed way compared with the 
anti-national sectarian militant groups like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, the Sipah-e-Sahaba, the 
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen al-Alami, etc inside Pakistan.71 In their campaign against terrorism 
the state seem to have  been conspicuously selective and perhaps self-serving. One of 
reason for inaction is also that such groups enjoy considerable support within the 
military itself. Given the increasingly potent strength of such groups and the endemic 
violence that they perpetrate, the military's power over such groups has been described 
as a 'facade that must crack sooner or later'. 72 
 
     In the light of such evidence there is more of a chance of continuity of JAH's policy on 
it's jihadist connections in the future. As they have increased their ability to raise funds 
globally through Saudi patronized Salafist networks, their networks have become less 
dependent on direct state assistance and hence less amenable to state influence. In case 
of the extremist elements, the jihadis eliminated through the use of force are quickly 
replaced by more powerful cadres, who are constantly being inducted through their 
madrassa networks.73  
 
      The JAH, like other contemporary Islamist groups, is aware of it's strength and the 
government‘s weaknesses. It seems cognizant that until Pakistan‘s government keeps on 
relying on militant Islamists for the consolidation of state power and support in 
Kashmir, it will continue to court such Islamist partners. 74 For the foreseeable future, 
then, groups like JAH will continue to constitute a fringe element and exert it's marginal 
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